A congestion control scheme based on credibility is proposed. In this scheme, the whole n etwork is divided into several indepen dent domains, a nd e ach dom ain con tains a congestion contro l server (CCS) and several control modules (CM). The CCS is used to collect credit information and make punish ment decisions based on the credit information, wh ile th e CM cr eates si gnaling packets to calculate responsibility mark. Violators will be punished according to the ir responsibil ity mark. The eff ectiveness of this scheme is also analyzed. W e p rovide sim ulation results to demonstrate that the proposed scheme can process congestion and provide better performance gains.
In t his p aper, we propose a cred ibility-based congestion contr ol sch eme [ 4] an d it works at n etwork layer. Fo r th is sch eme, o nly so urce is resp onsible for traffic shaping, other elements in network don't need to do th is work, so th e co st of network is decreased. The whole network i s di vided i nto se veral domains, s o t he risk among network is isolated effectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 in troduces the related works; in sectio n 3, the proposed sch eme is exp lained i n detail; th e effectiveness of t he p roposed sc heme i s explained i n section 4; numerical simulations are given in section 5; section 6 concludes this paper up.
Fig. 1 Illustration of domain

Related Works
In the last few years, TCP congestion control policy has been ex tensively stu died in t he literatures [5] - [9] . Th e primary methods re gulate t he co ngestion window si ze maintained by each TCP se nder [5] . The com ing approaches f or network co ngestion co ntrol c over a broad range of techniques, including source quench [6] , slow st art, sc hedule-based c ontrol [ 7] , binary feed back [8] a nd rate -based c ontrol [ 9] . M oreover, Lo w [10] proposed an op timization fra mework b ased on utility function, and d esigned a series of n ew co ngestion control schem es that can a chieve relative bala nce of objectives: using n etwork effectiv ely, allo cating resource fairly and low queuing delay.
The TCP c ongestion c ontrol an d t he c ongestion control sc heme based on o ptimization al l work at t he transport layer, so it m ay cause si gnificant d elay between congestion occurring and taking control action. If th e leng th of info rmation sequence is very sh ort, the feedback m ay be a rrived aft er t he s ource se nt al l dat a. Therefore, a cred ibility-based co ngestion co ntrol scheme i s pr oposed i n t his pa per. It w orks at t he network layer, and can take control action immediately. The a dvantages of t his sc heme cont ain: d on't nee d t o allocate resource at network layer, only increase t he complexity of the s hared resource (switch, etc.); ca n decrease the cost of whole network.
The proposed sch eme is similar to co mputational intelligence, an d it is self-ad aptive. In t he b eginning, there are a number of violators. When violator realizes the serou s punishment, it will restrict its b ehavior. The most serio us violator will be prohibited fro m u sing network. Finally, there are only several violators so that the entire network will be more safe and reliable.
Credibility-based Congestion Control Scheme
Definition
Domains are usu ally divided into several subnets in th e light of regions or ot her purposes. Fi g. 1 shows a network example. The thick circles denote subnets, and it co ntains smaller su bnet (th in circles) o r term inal nodes (rectangles).
We define a d omain as a s ubnet which has congestion co ntrol sc hemes and r uns i ndependently. A domain consists of one congestion control server (CCS) and several port controllers (PC). CCS is responsible for storing a nd c ollecting ge neral i nformation, PCs co ntrol communication wi th ot her parts in net work. The basi c idea is t o c ompute each CCS's responsibility mark according to congestion state, and then use thi s information to give punishment to CCS related domains. The en tire network's respo nsibility is p roviding each node's responsibility mark to the decision center, so that the punishment can be decided.
Congestion Control Model
The co ngestion co ntrol model is sh own in Fig . 2 . Data are sen t fro m rig ht to left. Th e righ t irreg ular circle denotes the source subnet, the left one is the d estination subnet, a nd t he m iddle ci rcle i s t he domain named A where congestion occurs. A connected with source and destination su bnets t hrough ports which in clude congestion control modules (CM). We call the entrance module i n port con nects source s ubnet a nd A as InM, and the outlet module in port connects A and destination subnet as OutM. S a nd D is source and destination, the diamond shows congestion point.
The congestion control process will create five kinds of si gnaling packets: M ar packet, Re p packet, Imp packet, Dif packet and Res packet. Their specifications are given as follows:
Mar p acket: w hen congestio n h appens, th e corresponding switching equipment samples some data pac kets, a nd cha nges these data packets int o Mar packets by altering the data packets' header. In dom ain's views, c ongestion CMs are t he 
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Sr i j = . (c) Ac knowledgement sampling [ , ] Sa i j : a s ource needs to ta ke on som e responsibility whe n it acknowledges violation. The calculating principle is that in one c ounting tim e, if one c ongestion CM acknowledges vi olation, other m odules can a void punishment, only the o ne acknowledges be sc ored. Situation m ay exits that sev eral m odules acknowledge violation, and th en all m odules would be scor ed one mark. In all above situations, [ 
We set a period of tim e to im plement this m ethod. Take R as an obj ect's responsibility mark in one counting time, which concerns the whole network effect. The t otal sc ore in the set pe riod of ti me can be calculated as follows:
U n is the total score after n counting times, [ ] R n is the responsibility m ark i ncluding other m odules' e ffect in counting tim e [ ] n , 0 1
, w here M is the equivalent time length of counting times. Similarly, we can get formulas forUl , Ua and Ur as follows:
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Ur n Rr n [ ] Ur n is left-total score, ack-total score and right-total score after n counting ti mes. Sources are responsi ble for Ua and Ur in InM, a nd destinati ons a re resp onsible f or Ul in OutM. Ul ,Ur andUa are computed in each congestion CM, and be sent to the CCS after a given period of time to get the quantification punishment.
Effectiveness of Credibility-based Congestion Control Scheme
Credibility means that all nodes are well-reputed except violators. Thus, acc ording t o the n umber o f violators and the re putation of vi olators, t he c ongestion ca n be divided into five cases in a domain. (i) The violation of one trustful source node As shown in Fig. 4 , there is a trustf ul source node S violating the rules, which causes congestion in a domain, so c ongestion co ntrol sc heme is triggered.
Single domain
After receiving a Dif packet belongs to S, it sends back a Res packet which carries ac knowledgement inform ation t o InM A, and accounts for taking responsibility. The punishment result is that the violator S and its connected
In t his case, source nodes S 1 、S 3 and S 4 will send back Res pac kets carrying ac knowledgement information, because none of them violates the rules. As the so urce node S 2 is the vi olator a nd is distrustful, it will also send bac k Res pac ket carrying acknowledgement inf ormation in order to av oid responsibility. All source nodes se nd bac k Res pac kets carrying acknowledgement information, so the CCS can not ide ntify w hich one is t he violato r. T herefore, that congestion should be i n c harge of responsi bility by all four In Ms (A 、 B 、 C a nd D) on average . T heir responsibility marks are calculated based on their traffic level. The InM forwarding heavy traffic will undertake main responsi bility, because the heavy tra ffic has hi gh possibility causing congestion. There are tw o m ethods t o i dentify t he violator. 1) when CCS receiving alar m, it starts m onitoring equipment which is an arbitra tion equipment to i dentify the violator; 2) if there is no monitoring equipment, the innocent nodes may tolerant until reach their threshold. Then the innocent nodes may install m easuring module that will incurring som e costs. Finally, all node s install measuring m odules exce pt t he violator, s o it is easy to identify the violator in that case.
After identified violator, it will be punished hea vily and be set lo w repute lev el. Th e punish ment i s calculated by ti me interval from the beginning of congestion t o ide ntifying violator m ultiply the maximum cost per time.
(iii) The violation of multiple trustful source nodes As shown in Fig. 5 , suppose the source nodes S 1 and S 2 violate the rules ca using congestion but the source nodes S 3 and S 4 do not v iolate th e ru les, so co ngestion control sc heme is t riggered. A s all so urce n odes are well-reputed, S 1 and S 2 will send bac k Res packets carrying ac knowledgement inf ormation to A a nd B respectively; S 3 and S 4 wi ll send back Res packets carrying cla rification inform ation. T heir responsibility marks are undertaken by S 1 、S 2 、A and B, and the mark of other InMs and source nodes will not be reduced.
(iv) The violation of multiple source nodes and only one distrustful source node Suppose m ultiple source nodes violate the rules causing congestion but only one distrustful source node. In that case, the violator may not be punished, but it will generate heavy traffic again violating the rules owing to the fluke mind. Therefore, the violator will be identified sooner or later according to the case (ii).
(v) The violation of multiple distrustful source nodes Suppose m ultiple source nodes violate the rules causing co ngestion an d none of them is trust ful n ode. That case is si milar to the ca se (iv), so t he violator will be identified ultimately according to the case (ii).
Multiple domains (i) The violation of one trustful source node
As shown in Fig. 6 , there is a trustful source node S 1 communicating with destination D, but it violates the rules that ca using several congestion points in m ultiple domains, so c ongestion c ontrol schem e is trigge red. Then all InMs located at the same domain as congestion points will identify the violator. As S 1 is well-reputed, it will send back Res pac ket carrying ac knowledgement information to its InM, and S 2 will send back Res packet carrying clarification info rmation. T he responsibility mark is only undertaken by S 1, and it is calculated by the number of congestion points. (ii) The violation of one distrustful source node Suppose there is a trustful source violating the rules, which ca uses n c ongestion points in m ultiple dom ains, so n*x node will be treate d unjustly, where x is the number of traffic ac ross congestion points. T heir responsibility mark y is scaled by the sampling value of Cac. Therefore, the acknowledge responsibility mark of the violator is n*y. (iii) The violation of multiple trustful source nodes Suppose m ultiple tr ustful s ource nodes vi olate the rules. A s all source nodes are inter -independent, t he interferences among them are very low. Therefore, that case is similar to the case (i).
(iv) The violation of multiple source nodes and only one distrustful source node Suppose m ultiple tr ustful s ource nodes vi olate the rules and only one distrustful source node. As all source nodes are inte r-independent, the interfere nces am ong them are very low. T herefore, that case is sim ilar to the case (ii).
(v) The violation of multiple distrustful source nodes Suppose multiple distrustful source nodes violate the rules. A s all source nodes are inter -independent, t he interferences among them are very low. Therefore, that case is similar to the case (ii).
Numerical Simulations
According to the effective ness the ory of cre dibilitybased co ngestion c ontrol sch eme in section 4, we o nly need t o c onsider the case having o ne violator which is enough t o vali date the feasi bility and effe ctiveness of the proposed congestion control scheme. The sim ulation network t opology is s hown in Fi g. 7.
Simulation topology
Node 11 an d 12 are s ource nodes, n ode 9 an d 1 0 a re destinations, node 16 is InM, node 15 is Ou tM, node 2 is router which c ollects link inform ation a nd calculate path for term inal nodes. Suppose node 11 will send packets to node 10, and node 12 will send packets to node 9.
To compare the proposed congestion control scheme with c ommon netw ork, we also run sim ulation in the comparison t opology which substitutes InM and OutM by ordinary switch nodes.
Establishment of node model
There are four kin ds o f no de models in the netw ork including: term inal node , switch node, InM/OutM a nd router. The terminal node is used to generate traffic and receive traffic and it does not nee d to modify. The router refers to r outing al gorithm and so me signalin g protocols, so i t is o ut of our co nsideration. Th us, only InM/OutM an d s witch n ode model nee d t o de sign an d implement in OPNET [11] .
In or der to coordinate with the proposed schem e, only the queue module within switch node needs to be modified. The main functions of q ueue m odule are: cache packets and schedule.
The processing flowchart of queue is very important for the proposed congestion scheme. As shown in Fig. 8 , when the lengths of queue reach 50%, the low priority packet m ay be dropped t o guarantee the s uccess transmission of high priority packet. The InM/OutM node locate d at the edge of domain and edge of domain is im plemented by switch node, so the I nM/OutM n ode m odel should be a s witch node model. Their di fference is that t he C M should be plugged i nto t he I nM/OutM. The flowchart of C M is shown in Fig. 9 .
Validation of the proposed scheme
In t he case t hat violation of one source node, we set node 12 is t he violator, which means that node 12 uses more bandwidth than it applied for, and then generate a congestion point at node 3. The parameter values use d in the simulation are set as follows. The simulation time is set to 150s. The node 11 and 12 start sending packet at tim e 100s. The queue capacity of node 3 is set to 9600bit. If the size of packets sent from node is 1024bit, that is not a violation; if the node send packet with size of 4096bit or above, it will violate the rules. The working period of InM/OutM is set to 150s.
After running th e pr oposed cong estion co ntrol scheme, if InM/OutM ca n iden tify the vi olator 12, that can prove the proposed scheme is feasible.
The neighbor relationships of OutM 15 and InM 16 are given below. In outM 15, node 9、node 10、node 8 and node 7 are connected by port 1、port 2、port 3 and port 4 r espectively. In In M 16 , nod e 4、node 5 、node 11 and node 12 are connected by port 1、port 2、port 3 and port 4 respectively.
The simulation results of OutM 15 and InM 16 are shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 respectively. As shown in Fig. 10 , it is seen that only column port 1 and p ort 2 have non-zero value, beca use terminal nodes are connected by port 1 and port 2. The OutM 15 received 10 a nd 7 Cre p pa ckets from node 9 a nd 10 respectively, a nd also recei ved 10 and 7 Cim packets from node 9 a nd 1 0 res pectively. T he reason is: w hen congestion happen at n ode 3, t he OutM 1 5 se nds R ep packets based on Mar packet which created by node 3 to terminal no de 9 a nd 10 re spectively. The n n ode 9 a nd 10 send Imp packets to InM 16. Afte r InM 16 received Imp packets, it sends Dif packets to source node 11 and 12 respectively. Finally, the source node 11 and 12 send Res packets to OutM 15. As shown in Fig. 11 , it can be seen that only column port 3 and po rt 4 ha ve no n-zero value, bec ause source nodes are connected by port 3 and port 4. The InM 16 received 17 Ccl and 17 Cdi packets from node 11, and received 17 Cac and C di packets from node 12. Apparently, node 11 does not violate rules because InM received cla rification i nformation from node 11, but node 12 violates rules causing congestion because InM received acknowledgement information from node 12. It can be concluded that the proposed c redibility-based congestion control sc heme can i dentify t he violators accurately.
Performance Evaluation
The performance of net work is m ainly describe d by packet drop ratio, t hroughput, tra nsmission delay, transmission jitter, and so on. In t his sim ulation, throughput and e nd-to-end delay are used to illustrate the effect of t he proposed c ongestion cont rol scheme comparing to the case of without congestion control.
The parameter values use d in the simulation are set as follows. T he simulation end time is set to 150s. The node 11 and 1 2 start sen ding pac ket at time 10s. The queue ca pacity of switch nodes is set to 750bit. The length of data pac ket is set to 30bit. T he packet i nterarrival tim e subjects t o Poisson distribution, a nd its mean value is set to 1s.
Network throughput is the average rate of successful packet d elivery ov er a lin k. Fig. 12 shows th e comparison re sults of throughput under th e case of having co ngestion c ontrol an d with out co ngestion control. I n t his sim ulation, data packets are se nt according t o Poisson distri bution, which m eans that traffic is added with time elapsing.
It is seen that throughput is inc reased with t raffic increasing, but when tra ffic reac h at som e value, throughput reach its m aximum value. If a dditional packets a re se nt to net work continually, throughput is not i ncreased because of c ongestion. T he threshold of queue length is set ahead. When processing time larger than packet i nter-arrival tim e, som e packets m ay be dropped due t o the que ue reaching its li mit. Thus, on account of li mit of queue le ngth, when there is heavy traffic on network, throughput tends to b alance, but not decreases sharply. Under the condition of light tr affic, thr oughput of network with and without congestion control sc heme is almost sam e. Ho wever, th e thr oughput of network without congestion control sc heme keeps at lowe r value than congestion control scheme when the same traffic is employed. The reason is that many packets are dropped due t o c ongestion w hich ca uses lo w t hroughput, but congestion con trol sch eme can avo id co ngestion to some extent.
(ii) End-to-end delay End-to-end de lay refers to the tim e take n for a packet to be transmitted across a network form source to destination. Fi g. 13 shows the c omparison results of end-to-end delay with and without congestion control. It is seen that end-to-end delays both tend to balance after jitter pe riod under t he t wo cases. The end-to-e nd delay eq uals about 0.55s under t he ca se o f without congestion control, whereas that value is about 0.54s with congestion control.
In ge neral, end-to-end delay is com posed of transmission delay, propagation delay and queue delay. It is defined as follows. (7) where N is the number of links.
In our simulation, since the distances between nodes are close a nd bandwidth of link is 1Gbps, transmission delay and propagation delay can be omitted. Equation (7) can be simplified to Therefore, the n umber of l inks f rom source t o destination can be obtained by equation (8) . The number of links with congestion control equals 0.54/0.09=6, and it can be validated from Fig. 7 .
Through a bove sim ulations, the proposed credibility-based c ongestion co ntrol sche me is proved that it can work accurate ly. The pe rformance of throughput and delay can be improved by the proposed scheme.
Conclusion
This pa per proposed a c redibility-based congestion control m ethod at netw ork l ayer. It divi ded the w hole network i nto seve ral domains, t hus fa cilitated the question. It relied on sources' sel f-restrict to a void congestion, traffic shaping is only needed to be done in ports and great resources would be saved. By collecting and computing responsibility mark of each element, the congestion c ontrol se rver wo uld m ake decisio ns according to the m ark, and m ade appropriate punishment to violato rs. Moreover, the effectiveness of this schem e is analy zed. We p rovided exte nsive simulation results to demonstrate t hat t he proposed scheme can process c ongestion a nd p rovided bette r performance gain s (throughput an d d elay) th an without congestion control.
